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The Devaluation Effect: Activating a Need
Devalues Unrelated Objects
C. MIGUEL BRENDL
ARTHUR B. MARKMAN
CLAUDE MESSNER*
It is commonly assumed that an object capable of satisfying a need will be perceived
as subjectively more valuable as the need for it intensifies. For example, the more
active the need to eat, the more valuable food will become. This outcome could
be called a valuation effect. In this article, we suggest a second basic influence
of needs on evaluations: that activating a focal need (e.g., to eat) makes objects
unrelated to that need (e.g., shampoo) less valuable, an outcome we refer to as
the devaluation effect. Two existing studies support the existence of a devaluation
effect using manipulations of the need to eat and to smoke and measuring at-
tractiveness of consumer products and willingness to purchase raffle tickets. Fur-
thermore, the evidence suggests that consumers are not aware of the devaluation
effect and its influence on their preferences.
In research on decision making, one of the core theoreticalconstructs relating to preference is utility. Models based
on utility assume that people’s preferences for an object or
its properties depend on the degree to which the object or
property can satisfy some active goal. The utility of an object
will vary as people’s goals relating to that object change in
intensity. Thus utility (as well as common sense) is consis-
tent with a valuation relation between goals and choice
whereby an object is valued according to the extent that it
is perceived as instrumental to satisfying an active goal. For
example, food should be perceived as more valuable when
people need to eat than when they do not (see Markman
and Brendl [2000] for further discussion).
In order to select a goal and to maintain goal-directed
behavior, however, the motivational system may have to rely
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on more than just the valuation of goal-relevant objects. For
example, once selected, the motivational system must pro-
tect the active goal from tempting alternatives. One way to
achieve this could be by reducing the attractiveness of po-
tentially tempting objects that are not instrumental to sat-
isfying the active goal. For example, a strong need to eat
may make movie tickets less attractive. This outcome would
be a devaluation of objects unrelated to a focal goal.
The purpose of this article is to establish the existence of
the devaluation effect and its influence on preference for-
mation. Although we will not directly investigate those
mechanisms driving the devaluation effect, we discuss a
range of possible causes at a later stage.
Valuation and Devaluation
Lewin (1935) established the relationship between the
evaluation of objects and goals by suggesting that objects
are perceived as positive or negative (i.e., they have a va-
lence) to the extent that they support or hinder active goals.
The capacity of an object to satisfy goals or needs is also
called instrumentality (Rosenberg 1956; see also Lynch,
Marmorstein, and Weigold [1988], from a perspective of
diagnosticity). Models of goals and consumer choice have
focused on the influence of activating goals on the attrac-
tiveness of objects related to these goals (Brendl and Higgins
1996; Ratneshwar, Mick, and Huffman 2000).
By devaluation of unrelated objects, we mean objects that
are neither perceived as instrumental nor as disinstrumental
(i.e., counterproductive) to the focal need or goal. By need
we mean a state associated with a physiologically based
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outcome, whereas a goal is a state associated with a psy-
chological outcome. Lewin also introduced the idea that
psychological goals cause needlike states or “quasi needs”
that can differ in activation. In support of the notion of quasi
needs, subjects who were interrupted before they could com-
plete a task were more likely to spontaneously take up the
task again than were subjects who had not been interrupted.
Presumably, a task goal is active until it is reached, making
any activity that can help reach that goal momentarily more
desirable. While this article focuses on needs, Lewin’s work
suggests that goals share important properties with needs.
Although valuation follows directly from the assumption
that preference for an object is related to its utility, there
have been surprisingly few demonstrations that activation
of a focal goal increases the attractiveness of goal-related
objects. There is clear evidence for valuation effects for
some perceptual experiences, such as smell, taste, and ther-
mal perception. For example, fasting subjects rated the
pleasantness of tasting a sweet solution more highly than
nonfasting subjects. Sniffing orange syrup was pleasant for
fasting subjects but unpleasant after having ingested a glu-
cose load. Subjects immersed in a warm bath found dipping
their hand into cold and warm water respectively pleasant
and unpleasant, whereas the reverse was true for subjects
sitting in a cold bath (Cabanac 1971).
While the research of the Lewin group on quasi needs is
consistent with valuation effects, it is equally consistent with
devaluation effects. As an example, consider subjects whose
goal is to finish a puzzle. Goal-related activities (solving a
puzzle) are strongly preferred to goal-unrelated activities
(e.g., magazine browsing, daydreaming) when the goal is
active rather than passive. If the attractiveness of goal-un-
related activities decreases, then goal-related activities will
become relatively more attractive. A similar argument could
be made for “invigoration effects” (Klinger 1975), whereby
putting barriers in a sequence of goal-directed animal be-
haviors increases the vigor of these behaviors. This view is
also consistent with Ouellette and Wood’s (1998) suggestion
that past behavior predicts future behavior by strengthening
the relationship between an active goal and an action.
There is substantial evidence that activating a goal or need
affects perceptions and cognitions in a way that supports
fulfillment of that need or goal (Klinger 1975). For instance,
people pay more attention to goal-related than to goal-un-
related stimuli (Ratneshwar et al. 1997). People also inter-
pret ambiguous stimuli in a need-consistent manner and
judge goal-related objects to be larger and brighter than they
are. In a classic study, coins were judged to be larger by
poor children than rich children (Bruner and Goodman
1947). In this article we seek direct evidence for the influ-
ence of need activation on evaluations.
Few studies have examined the influence of goal acti-
vation on some form of evaluation. In two studies, normal-
weight consumers have been shown to purchase more gro-
ceries than originally planned when hungry compared with
when not hungry (Gilbert and Wilson 2000; Nisbett and
Kanouse 1969). Other studies have shown that there is a
greater preference for goal-related objects over goal-unre-
lated objects when a focal need is strong. In one study, the
greater the subjects’ hunger, the stronger their preference
for candy over fruit (Read and van Leeuwen 1998). In an-
other study, subjects were more likely to want answers to
trivia questions than to want candy when they had actually
attempted to answer the question as opposed to when they
had not (cited in Loewenstein and Schkade 1999). In these
studies, however, the preference for goal-related objects over
goal-unrelated objects may reflect either a valuation effect
(e.g., an increase in the evaluation of trivia answers) or a
devaluation effect (e.g., a decrease in the evaluation of
candy).
In sum, there is strong evidence that activating a need or
goal increases the preference for need-related objects over
need-unrelated objects. However, with the exception of per-
ceptions (taste, smell, temperature), it is not clear whether
this shift of preference is due to valuation of goal-related
objects, devaluation of goal-unrelated objects, or both. Thus,
to obtain evidence capable of separating valuation from de-
valuation effects, we need to explore people’s preferences
for individual objects rather than look at relative preferences
for goal-related objects over goal-unrelated objects.
Preliminary Evidence and the Logic of Our
Studies
To demonstrate the logic of our studies, we describe a
previously published experiment (the Bursar Bill Study) that
demonstrates a devaluation of a goal-unrelated object
(Brendl, Markman, and Higgins 1998).1 At the time the
study was presented, we did not recognize the presence of
a devaluation effect. Students were asked how much they
would be willing to pay for a raffle ticket with a prize of
either a $1,000 waiver on their university bill or $1,000 in
cash. Participants were questioned either while queuing at
the bursar’s office to pay their bill or while sitting in a
cafeteria on campus. The goal of paying university bills
should have been more active at the bursar’s office than at
the cafeteria.
In support of a devaluation effect, students offered the
raffle with the cash prize were willing to pay less for a ticket
when approached at the bursar’s office (high bill paying
goal) ( ) than when approached at a cafeteria (lowMp $0.93
bill paying goal) ( ), ,Mp $1.73 F(1, 101)p 12.82 p !
, .
2 In contrast, students offered the raffle with a.01 hp .34
bill waiver as prize were willing to pay only nonsignificantly
more for a ticket when approached in the bursar’s office
(high bill paying goal) ( ) than when approachedMp $1.52
at a cafeteria (low bill paying goal) ( ),Mp $1.20
, , . To support the valu-F(1, 101)p 1.41 pp .24 hp .12
1An English translation of Brendl et al. 1998 is available from the first
two authors of the current article.
2Due to an editing error, in Markman and Brendl (2000) we had stated
slightly incorrect values for two of the four means reported here. Fortu-
nately, even these incorrect means are consistent with the conclusions we
are drawing in the present article.
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ation effect this difference would need to be significant.
Interestingly, the devaluation effect is significant.
Because this study is correlational, we cannot rule out
that the two groups of subjects differed in dimensions other
than the goal to pay or need to eat.3 To address this problem
we manipulated a physiological need (the need to smoke in
study 1 and the need to eat in study 2). In addition, we do
not know whether the measure of willingness to pay reflects
what subjects would do if given actual choices. The follow-
ing study elicited real choices from subjects.
STUDY 1: THE CIGARETTE STUDY
Smoke-deprived subjects participated in a study about
smoking habits. Some subjects were permitted to smoke at
the start of the study, and some were not, creating either a
low or high need to smoke, respectively. Disguised as part
of their remuneration, subjects were allowed to purchase
raffle tickets that could win cash or cigarettes (manipulated
between subjects). As they were told that the raffle would
be held two weeks later, neither the cash nor cigarette prize
could be used to satisfy any of their current goals.
If we observe a devaluation effect in this study, then
participants who could win the cash prize and have not yet
smoked (and thus have a high need to smoke) should buy
fewer tickets than participants who have already smoked
(and thus have a low need to smoke). This prediction follows
from the assumption that high smoking need leads to a
devaluation of cash.
Using cash in this study is a particularly conservative test
of the devaluation effect because cash can be instrumental
in satisfying a smoking need in that it can be used to pur-
chase cigarettes. Obviously, cash cannot be smoked directly
and thus might not be perceived as instrumental. Finding a
devaluation effect for cash would suggest that objects that
can be conceptualized as instrumental may not automatically
be categorized as such.
The valuation effect should be obtained for those partic-
ipants who can win a cigarette prize. Participants offered a
cigarette raffle who have not yet smoked (and thus have a
high need to smoke) should buy more tickets than those
who have already smoked (and thus have a low smoking
need). The valuation and devaluation predictions are inde-
pendent so that one effect could be obtained without the
other.
For exploratory purposes we introduced a third manip-
ulation inspired by research on the “endowment effect”
(Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990), which implies that
people evaluate choice options but not the means with which
they pay for them. We varied the stake used by subjects to
purchase tickets. Half of the subjects in each condition could
purchase raffle tickets using cash. The other half could pur-
3There is one alternative explanation that probably does not apply: that
those with the goal of paying with cash in a cafeteria will value money
more than those with the goal of paying with checks at the bursar’s office.
However, students at the cafeteria were interviewed after they had paid
(hence when their goal was deactivated), and most of them did not pay
with cash but instead with cash credits from their meal plan.
chase tickets using cigarettes. The size of stake resulted only
in a main effect (reported below) and is therefore not dis-
cussed further. In sum, we predicted a valuation effect for
subjects given the raffle with the cigarette prize and a de-
valuation effect for subjects given the raffle with the cash
prize.
Method
Design and Overview. The design was a 2# 2# 2
between-subject factorial with smoking need (low vs. high),
prize (cash vs. cigarettes), and stake (cash vs. cigarettes) as
between-subject factors. Smoking need was manipulated by
approaching deprived smokers in a lecture hall and either
letting them smoke (low need) or not letting them smoke
(high need). By buying raffle tickets subjects could win a
prize two weeks later, either 100 DM in cash or two cartons
of cigarettes. The stake consisted of buying these tickets
either with cash or with cigarettes.
Subjects. Subjects were 270 students at a German uni-
versity who were habitual smokers. They took part in
exchange for a cup of coffee and the opportunity to partic-
ipate in a raffle. The following subjects were excluded prior
to the analysis: nine subjects who indicated that they rolled
their own cigarettes (for whom the value of a carton of
regular cigarettes was unclear), two subjects who partici-
pated in the study but did not take part in the previous class
(hence their uncertain status as smoke deprived), and four
subjects due to experimenter error. The data from the re-
maining 255 subjects were analyzed.
Procedure and Materials. An experimenter entered a
classroom either in the middle or at the end of a 90-minute
class. The experimenter announced a 10-minute survey and
sought the participation of smokers in exchange for a cup
of coffee and the possibility of participating in a raffle. If
a class had been assigned to the high smoking need con-
dition, the experimenter remained in the classroom. Smok-
ing in classrooms was strictly prohibited and consequently
participants had been deprived of smoking for at least the
duration of their class. If a class had been assigned to the
low smoking need condition, the experimenter asked the
subjects to step out into the hallway. Two experimenters
were involved; at any given time one ran the high need
condition and the other ran the low need condition, alter-
nating with each session. The experimenter began the study
by serving the promised coffee to subjects. High need sub-
jects were required to stay in the smoke-free classroom
whereas low need subjects observed how the experimenter
lit a cigarette and, if they had not started to smoke already,
followed this example without exception. In each condition
the experimenter waited until subjects had finished their
coffee and then gave each a questionnaire and an envelope.
The first page of the questionnaire served as an unobtru-
sive check of the smoking need manipulation and was pre-
sented as an investigation of the perception of objects in
daily use. Using a scale depicting 14 cigarettes ranging in
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length from 80 mm to 90 mm, subjects were asked to circle
the illustration that reflected the true length of a standard
cigarette. In accordance with the aforementioned studies on
estimating the sizes of coins (Bruner and Goodman 1947),
we expected that subjects with a high need to smoke would
judge the standard cigarette to be longer than those with a
low need.
The second page was a consent form presenting the raffle,
which explained that, instead of paying participants indi-
vidually, the money had been pooled to buy raffle prizes
for which only survey participants were eligible. It stated
that participation was voluntary, that a maximum of 100
persons could participate, that three prizes would be drawn,
and that participants could buy as many raffle tickets as they
wished. It was made clear that the raffle prizes would be
drawn publicly (at least) nine days later to ensure that instant
need gratification would not affect subjects’ choices. Win-
ners would be notified by mail. Responses were collected
using a scale showing the number of raffle tickets purchased,
with values ranging from zero to 10, plus an additional box
where the subject could enter a larger number of tickets.
Depending on the condition, the scale title indicated the
ticket price—25 pfennigs (about 14¢) or one cigarette. The
cash raffle offered three prizes of DM 100, whereas the
cigarette raffle offered three prizes of two cartons of ciga-
rettes of the brand of the subject’s choice. At the time the
study was run, the retail value of a carton of cigarettes was
DM 50. On a subsequent page, subjects rated their current
need to smoke on an eight-point scale ranging from 1 (low
need) to 8 (high need).
Other items followed—including a smoking addiction
questionnaire—to enhance the credibility of the experiment
but are irrelevant to the present analysis. Although subjects
were under the impression that the survey would begin after
completion of the consent form, the actual experiment was
finished at this point. Finally, subjects put their payment for
tickets into an envelope and returned it along with the ques-
tionnaire to the experimenter.
The drawing was held publicly at the conclusion of the
study. All winners were given cash prizes (rather than cig-
arettes), and all stakes were returned to subjects.
Summary of Dependent Variables. Our main depen-
dent measure was the number of raffle tickets bought. Cig-
arette length estimates and ratings of need to smoke served
as manipulation checks on the need to smoke.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation Checks. The first task was to judge the
length of a standard cigarette on a scale ranging from short
(80 mm) to long (90 mm). Subjects low in smoking need
judged the length of a cigarette to be shorter ( mm)Mp 83
than those high in smoking need ( mm),Mp 85
, , , consistent with our as-t(252)p 4.15 p ! .05 hp .25
sumption that these two groups differed in smoking need.
In addition, after making their choice, subjects rated their
need to smoke on a scale from 1 (low need) to 8 (high need).
Subjects who had just smoked a cigarette judged their need
to be lower ( ) than those who had not smokedMp 3.92
during the study ( ), , ,Mp 5.05 t(249)p 3.57 p ! .05
. A few subjects failed to respond to the cigarettehp .22
length rating ( ) or need to smoke ratings ( ).np 1 np 4
Number of Raffle Tickets Bought.4 The number of
raffle tickets purchased was submitted to a be-2# 2# 2
tween-subjects ANOVA of smoking need (low vs. high)#
prize (cash vs. cigarettes)# stake (cash vs. cigarettes). High
need subjects had not been allowed to smoke, whereas low
need subjects had been allowed to smoke before filling out
the survey. There were only two significant effects, all other
. First, there was a main effect of stake, such thatp’s ≥ .18
subjects bought more raffle tickets when they paid with cash
( ) than with cigarettes ( ),Mp 2.78 Mp .88 F(1, 247)p
, , . This effect, which simply reflects32.34 p ! .05 hp .34
a scale difference between cigarettes and cash, is not ger-
mane to our hypothesis.
Consistent with our predictions, however, there was a two-
way interaction between smoking need and prize,
, , . When the raffle prizeF(1, 247)p 4.08 p ! .05 hp .13
was cash, subjects bought significantly more tickets when
their need to smoke was low ( ) than when it wasMp 2.40
high ( ), , , .5 InMp 1.39 F(1, 251)p 4.02 p ! .05 hp .13
contrast, when the raffle prize was cigarettes, the number
of raffle tickets purchased did not differ significantly be-
tween subjects high ( ) or low ( ) in needMp 1.84 Mp 1.71
to smoke, , . Thus, the valuation effect rep-F ! 1 hp .02
resented by the two left bars in figure 1 (top panel) was not
significant.
One potential locus of the devaluation effect is that sub-
jects with a high need to smoke may be more likely than
subjects in the low need condition to ignore the raffle task
altogether. In this instance, we would expect that a greater
proportion of subjects in the high need condition would
purchase zero tickets than of those in the low need condition.
In fact, the proportion of subjects who did not buy any raffle
tickets was almost identical in both groups, , that is,2x ! 1
44.1% ( ) of low need subjects and 47.7% (np 127 np
) for those high in need to smoke. Thus, the strong128
devaluation effect is a result of differences in the number
of tickets bought between smoking need conditions, rather
than a difference between smoking need conditions in the
proportion of subjects who did not buy any tickets. A more
complex version of this alternative interpretation of the re-
sults would be that while subjects in a high need condition
would be unreceptive to raffles in general, they would be
receptive to raffles that win cigarettes. For subjects high in
need to smoke this hypothesis predicts more purchases of
4One subject in the “cash prize/low need” condition bought so many
lottery tickets (40) that s/he can be considered an outlier. We recoded the
bought tickets to the next lower level observed in the sample (20). Because
we predict the maximal purchases of lottery tickets for this condition, this
recoding is a conservative measure. In fact, without the recoding the de-
valuation effect reported in this section is slightly more reliable.
5These single degree of freedom contrasts were computed using a simple
effects ANOVA with smoking need nested within prize type.
DEVALUATION EFFECT 467
FIGURE 1
PREFERENCES AS A FUNCTION OF NEED ACTIVATION IN
STUDIES 1 (TOP PANEL) AND 2 (BOTTOM PANEL)
NOTE.—Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
raffle tickets that win cigarettes than win cash, a data pattern
that was not reliable, , , .F(1, 251)p 1.91 pp .17 hp .09
Further, this interpretation could not explain the results of
study 2 (see below) and would be implausible for the Bursar
Bill Study.
Study 1 is particularly related to research on the hot-cold
empathy gap (Loewenstein and Schkade 1999). As in their
earlier work, the present study demonstrates that subjects’
choices are affected by their current motivational state even
when they are likely to be in a different motivational state
when the chosen outcome is obtained. Although intuition
suggests that the hot-cold empathy gap results from an over-
valuation of objects that can satisfy the current active mo-
tivational state, our results suggest that undervaluation of
objects that are irrelevant to that state also contributes to
hot-cold empathy gaps.
STUDY 2: THE POPCORN STUDY
So far, we have seen that the number of raffle tickets
people purchased to win cash decreases in the presence of
a strongly active need to pay a bill (Bursar Bill Study) or
to smoke (study 1). This devaluation effect is interesting
from the standpoint of utility theories, because although cash
is instrumental for satisfying these goals, clearly subjects
do not perceive it as such. One potential concern is that the
devaluation effect only occurs with cash. To rule out this
possibility, study 2 demonstrates a devaluation effect with
a variety of consumer products. Further, to extend the con-
struct validity of our need manipulation, the study employs
a need-stimulation or appetizing manipulation instead of the
need-deprivation manipulations used in the studies reported
so far. Additionally, this study rules out conscious processes
as causes of the devaluation effect by pitting the unconscious
physiological need to eat against the conscious marker of
that need (i.e., hunger). As explained below, physiological
need states and their conscious markers are only very loosely
correlated. Hence we were able to create an experimental
group that felt hungry but had a low physiological need to
eat and a second group that felt less hungry but had a higher
physiological need to eat.
The manipulation in this study relies on well-established
findings on the influences of eating on body function (un-
derstood intuitively by gourmets for hundreds of years). The
physiological need to eat can be stimulated by first letting
people taste a very small quantity of food (Cornell, Rodin,
and Weingarten 1989; Rodin 1985) to prompt an appetizing
effect. (To this end good French restaurants typically offer
an amuse-bouche, or “mouth entertainment,” to start the
meal.) Research has clearly identified one important me-
diator of appetizing effects: the secretion of cephalic insulin,
so called because it is triggered by psychological cues such
as sight, smell, and taste (Powley 1977). Increased insulin
levels in the blood lead in turn to increased eating behavior
(Rodin 1985). Thus, a small amount of a food low in sugar
(such as popcorn) should be particularly effective in stim-
ulating the need to eat.
We differentially stimulated the need to eat by having one
group taste test popcorn at the beginning of the session (early
tasters) and another group at the end (late tasters). Subjects
were asked to rate 43 consumer products in a putatively
unrelated study that was described as collecting norms to
prepare the materials for a later study. Of these, 11 were
food products, and 32 were nonfood products. Thus, we first
gave early tasters an appetizer followed by the rating task.
In contrast, late tasters got the appetizer after the rating task.
When making their ratings, early tasters should have a
higher need to eat than late tasters, and the devaluation effect
predicts that, on average, early tasters should give lower
attractiveness ratings to nonfood products than late tasters.
This design also allows us to decouple the conscious ex-
perience of hunger from the physiological need to eat. In-
deed, it has been shown that physiological processes do not
necessarily map on to their conscious experiences. For ex-
ample, in a typical “excitation transfer” experiment, subjects
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engage in an arousing activity and some time later make a
judgment. At that point, they are not conscious of the fact
that the prior activity still arouses them, yet the arousal
affects their judgment (Zillmann 1978). Thus, the physio-
logical response, but not its source, affects judgment. As
another example, heroin addicts offered a choice between
different intravenous infusions whose contents were not
specified, reliably preferred a very low dose of cocaine to
a saline solution. They were unaware of this preference, as
indicated by their belief that they had sampled each infusion
equally often. They also felt that no solution contained a
drug and rated each solution as equally unattractive (Ber-
ridge 1999).
Research on hunger and addiction has demonstrated that
the conscious experience of hunger—like the subjective
feeling of a drug craving—is not strongly correlated with
physiological measures of need (Herman 1996; Kassel and
Shiffman 1992; Pinel, Assanand, and Lehman 2000; Tiffany
1990). These consciously accessible feelings are not markers
of the body’s physiological needs but instead tend to occur
when people are blocked from carrying out a consumption
goal (Tiffany 1990). Hence it is possible to make the group
with a lower physiological need feel more hungry than the
group with the higher physiological need. To do so we ex-
posed both groups to the smell of popcorn on entering the
lab and told both groups that they would be given popcorn
to taste, thereby increasing the physiological need to eat for
both groups equally and prompting both groups to set a goal
of eating popcorn.
The key difference between the groups is that early tasters
ate some popcorn before making their ratings and thus have
an additional physiological stimulation of their need to eat.
Eating some popcorn allowed them to satisfy their eating
goal. Late tasters, in contrast, did not receive the additional
physiological stimulation. Thus, while both groups should
be physiologically stimulated to eat by the smell, early tast-
ers should be more stimulated by the prior taste cue. The
late taster’s goal of eating should be boosted by the knowl-
edge that early tasters were already eating popcorn while
they were doing the rating task, and thus they should ex-
perience more hunger because the pursuit of their goal has
been blocked.
In sum, early tasters were more physiologically appetized
than late tasters but the latter were blocked from pursuing
their eating goal, which should result in greater hunger. We
expect to observe a devaluation effect for nonfood products
for the early tasters in accordance with the physiological
need of the subjects but not their conscious experience of
hunger. This pattern would further help to rule out the pos-
sibility that the devaluation effect occurs as a result of sub-
jects’ beliefs about how feelings of hunger influence the
subjective value of nonfood products.
Method
Subjects. In exchange for course credits, 150 under-
graduates at an American university were recruited. (One
subject was excluded from all analyses for failing to follow
instructions.)
Procedure and Materials. Subjects were put into
groups of four to eight. Just before they entered the lab, a
bag of microwave popcorn was popped to make the lab
smell of popcorn. Subjects were told that they were taking
part in a taste test and evaluation of a new brand of micro-
wave popcorn. Half of them were given the taste test (early
tasters), while the others were led into another room to
perform the attractiveness ratings task (late tasters). On com-
pletion of their first task, subjects were given the other task.
At the beginning of the taste test, subjects drank a glass
of water as a palate cleanser and tasted a handful of popcorn.
They were then asked to indicate on a scale with five ratings
the attractiveness of the popcorn they had just tasted and to
answer questions about their popcorn consumption and the
likelihood of purchasing the brand. The rating sheet invited
subjects to eat more popcorn if they wanted, allowing them
to satisfy their eating goals. In general, they did not eat more
than another handful of popcorn. It is important to note that,
as popcorn has few calories and is poorly digested, subjects
would have to eat much more than offered to overcome the
release of cephalic insulin.
The attractiveness ratings were introduced to help us norm
stimuli for a future experiment. Subjects rated 43 consumer
products on a scale of 1 (not very attractive) to 9 (very
attractive). Of these, 11 were food products, and 32 were
nonfood products. Some were generic products (e.g., DVD
player), and some were specific brands (e.g., Nike sneakers).
The order of the items as they appeared in the booklets was
generated randomly subject to the restriction that two food
products could not appear sequentially to minimize the pos-
sibility that subjects would see a connection between the
parts of the study. Pages were randomly ordered for each
subject. After completing their ratings, subjects were also
asked to rate their level of hunger on a scale from 1 (not
very hungry) to 9 (very hungry).
Results
Manipulation Check (Hunger Ratings). As expected,
subjects who initially tasted the popcorn (early tasters) rated
themselves as less hungry ( ) than did subjects whoMp 4.11
expected to taste their popcorn later (late tasters) (Mp
), , , .6 As indicated, the5.18 t(144)p 2.64 p ! .01 hp .05
need to eat of early tasters is physiologically more stimulated
than that of late tasters, even though early tasters rated them-
selves as less hungry. Thus, the need to eat was dissociated
from feelings of hunger. One reason why hunger ratings
were low for early tasters was that they could eat as much
popcorn as they wanted after the taste test and thus were
not conscious of any barrier to eating more food.7
Product Attractiveness Ratings. First, we computed
6Three subjects did not fill out the hunger rating.
7As mentioned above, subjects did not eat more than another handful
of popcorn. Thus, they remained physiologically appetized.
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separate arithmetic means of the attractiveness ratings of all
food products and nonfood products. Subsequently, we sub-
mitted these means to a simple effects ANOVA with the
factor time of tasting (early vs. late) nested within each level
of the factor type of product (nonfood vs. food). Consistent
with the predicted devaluation effect, early tasters evaluated
nonfood products less favorably ( ) than did lateMp 5.31
tasters ( ), , , .Mp 5.53 F(1, 147)p 4.34 p ! .05 hp .17
Remember that early tasters were assumed to be physio-
logically appetized. In addition, as in previous studies, the
valuation effect was not significant. Early tasters (Mp
) and late tasters ( ) evaluated food products5.17 Mp 5.04
similarly, , , (see fig. 1,F(1, 147)p 1.52 pp .22 hp .10
bottom panel). Not germane to our hypothesis, subjects rated
nonfood products more favorably ( ) than foodMp 5.41
products, ( ), , ,Mp 5.11 F(1, 147)p 15.66 p ! .05 hp
..31
This result cannot be explained by assuming that people
have a theory about how their preferences should be influ-
enced by a need to eat. The subjective experience of hunger
that is traditionally equated with the need to eat was dia-
metrically opposed to the need to eat in this study. Thus, if
people’s ratings were influenced by hunger, we should have
seen effects opposite to those observed. Instead, it is clear
from the data that the popcorn tasting affected ratings of
nonfood products.
It would further bolster our argument for a devaluation
effect if we could provide independent evidence that the
initial popcorn tasting stimulated the need to eat. Rating
food products as more attractive after tasting popcorn would
constitute such independent evidence because it would sug-
gest a valuation effect consistent with the appetizing ma-
nipulation. However, in three studies, as well as in a meta-
analysis, the valuation effects have been nonsignificant. As
indicated earlier, the only domain where solid, unambiguous
evidence for valuation effects exists is for certain percep-
tions (e.g., sweetness of taste). Although it may be possible
to get a valuation effect for more abstract evaluations, they
have been more difficult to obtain empirically.
In sum, study 2 provides strong evidence for a devaluation
effect. Early tasters whose need to eat was stimulated by
tasting popcorn rated nonfood products less favorably than
did late tasters whose need to eat had not yet been stimu-
lated. By exposing both early and late tasters to the smell
of popcorn, all subjects were made aware that they would
eventually eat popcorn. As a result, late tasters rated them-
selves as hungrier than early tasters, so it is unlikely that
subjects were aware that their physiological need to eat led
to a devaluation of nonfood products. Awareness should
have produced the opposite effect. Finally, by extending the
devaluation effect to a wide variety of consumer products,
we rule out the idea that the devaluation effect is limited to
the valuation of cash.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In our studies we have consistently observed a devalu-
ation effect. Activating a focal need decreased the evaluation
of choice options unrelated to this need. In study 1, the more
subjects needed to smoke, the less they paid for real raffle
tickets that could win cash. In study 2, the more our subjects’
physiological need to eat had been stimulated, the less at-
tractive they rated nonfood consumer products. In a pre-
viously published study, subjects with a more active goal
of paying a bill would have paid less for hypothetical raffle
tickets that could have won cash than subjects with a less
active goal of paying a bill (Brendl et al. 1998).
The consistency of the data across a variety of methods
suggests that the devaluation effect is not an artifact of
particular experimental methods. Specifically, we used both
deprivation and appetizing manipulations of need, smoking
and eating as needs, between-subject and within-subject
measures of preference, ratings and actual choices as mea-
sures of preference, and cash and consumer products as
need-unrelated objects.
Neither is the devaluation effect likely to be caused by
experimenter demand effects. Both studies 1 and 2 used
between-subject manipulations where subjects were not
aware of the other conditions of the study. More important,
in study 2, hunger—the consciously accessible marker of
need to eat—was manipulated in a way that showed the
opposite pattern from a need to eat. Thus, to the extent that
people were relying on their theory of how hunger should
influence their responses, their responses would have de-
creased the size of the devaluation effect.
Because our studies were designed to investigate the de-
valuation effect, it is difficult to draw conclusions from the
nonreliable valuation effects in our data. As discussed in
the introduction, valuation effects have reliably been found
in the perceptual domain. It is possible that valuation effects
are restricted to narrow perceptual categories and could
therefore not be detected reliably in our studies. It is also
conceivable that valuation effects can be more easily de-
tected when need activation levels are considerably higher
than in our studies. Our results call for a better understand-
ing, not only of the devaluation effect, but also of the val-
uation effect.
Plausible but Unlikely Causes of the Devaluation
Effect
The devaluation effect is an interesting phenomenon that
begs further explanation. While the current research does
not aim to distinguish among explanations, in the following
section we consider mechanisms that have been posited for
related phenomena, although none are likely candidates to
explain the devaluation effect.
Implementation Intentions. Gollwitzer (1993) has
demonstrated that simply committing to a goal is often not
sufficient to drive behavior: people must also develop spe-
cific plans or “implementation intentions“ to carry out goal-
directed actions. The intention to pursue a particular action
could devalue objects unrelated to that action. Implemen-
tation intentions cannot be the sole explanation for the de-
valuation effects reported here. If study 2 subjects focused
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on their hunger—which is their consciously accessible
marker of need activation— they would have exhibited a
pattern opposite to that obtained.
Postchoice Dissonance. When people commit to an
action, their evaluation of options to which they are not
committed will decrease. One common example of this phe-
nomenon is postchoice dissonance reduction where people
devalue an option they did not select (Festinger 1957). This
type of devaluation would not explain the effects of the
present studies because devaluations occurred before sub-
jects made choices.
Prechoice Devaluation of Related Choice Options.
A related phenomenon has been demonstrated prior to com-
mitment to choice by Russo and colleagues (e.g., Russo,
Medvec, and Meloy 1996; Russo, Meloy, and Medvec
1998). In their research, subjects chose between two choice
options such as buying one of two backpacks. Initially, they
were provided with a reason to prefer one over the other
that was unrelated to the product’s features, for example,
one backpack was produced by an alumnus of their alma
mater. As decision makers subsequently received product
information about the backpacks, they distorted the product
information in favor of the initially endowed backpack
(Russo et al. 1998), perhaps in an effort to maintain eval-
uative consistency between the initial endowment and sub-
sequent product evaluations.
We believe that our work complements that of Russo and
his colleagues whose hypothesis implies that people will
both favor the endowed object and reduce the desirability
of the nonendowed object. This reduced desirability is a
type of devaluation effect. Like Russo et al., we suggest
that an evaluative distortion can occur prior to committing
to an action. Whereas their work has focused on precom-
mitment distortions of related choice options, we focus on
precommitment distortions of unrelated choice options. Our
work suggests that the predecisional distortions they dis-
covered extend to unrelated choice options.
Shifts of Attention toward Focal Needs. The deval-
uation effect could perhaps be explained as a shift in atten-
tional resources to goal-related objects, leading to a deval-
uation of unattended objects. This process predicts stronger
valuation than devaluation effects because limited atten-
tional resources are shifted away from multiple goal-unre-
lated objects to just a few goal-related objects. Conse-
quently, the increase in assigned resources to related objects
ought be bigger than the decrease in resources from unre-
lated objects. The data pattern across all of our studies does
not support this prediction.
Possible Causes of the Devaluation Effect
The existing data place some constraints on an expla-
nation of the devaluation effect. An explanation must not
require that subjects deliberately focus on some needs nor
that they commit explicitly to an action or to a goal. Instead,
the mechanism underlying the devaluation effect appears to
function outside of awareness. Note, however, that our sub-
jects always had the intention of evaluating something.
Thus, we cannot (and do not wish to) conclude that deval-
uation is an uncontrollable response that occurs upon per-
ceiving an object. It might involve goal-dependent auto-
maticity (Bargh 1989), that is, automaticity that presupposes
the goal of evaluating some object.
We see three types of processes that could satisfy the
above constraints. First, motivational activation might be a
limited resource so that activating a particular need draws
activation away from unrelated needs and goals. Second,
activation of one need or goal might inhibit unrelated needs
and goals. In both cases, activation of one goal decreases
the activation of unrelated goals, which in turn decreases
the evaluation of objects associated with them. A third pos-
sibility is that the activation level of unrelated needs and
goals does not change but their access to evaluative re-
sponses is blocked. We discuss each of these options in turn.
Drawing Activation Away from Unrelated Needs and
Goals. Devaluation could be explained by assuming that
motivational activation is a limited resource. In this view,
activating one goal necessarily draws activation away from
other goals. This proposal is consistent with Anderson, Re-
der, and Lebiere’s (1996) suggestion that working memory
reflects a cap on the total amount of activation that can flow
through a semantic network. Thus, increasing the activation
of one concept will decrease the activation of other concepts
(see Alba and Chattopadhyay [1985, 1986], for related
mechanisms).
While this hypothesis is quite plausible, its simplest ver-
sion predicts that valuation effects would be larger than
devaluation effects. In particular, when the activation of a
specific goal increases, the combined activation of other
goals must decrease by an equivalent amount. Assuming
that there are many active goals, this decrease can be spread
across many different products, so the valuation effect
should be larger than the devaluation effect. Although this
is not borne out by our findings, we nonetheless feel this
view warrants further study.
Inhibition of Unrelated Needs and Goals. In many
domains of psychology there is evidence for active inhibi-
tory processes. For example, retrieving one item involves
actively inhibiting competing items in memory (Anderson,
Green, and McCulloch 2000Anderson and Spellman 1995).
Similarly, when a word has many meanings, those that are
irrelevant to a particular context are actively inhibited during
comprehension (Gernsbacher and Faust 1991; Neely 1976).
Synaptic inhibition is also a well-known neural mechanism
(e.g., Kuffler, Nichols, and Martin 1984). Likewise, one pos-
sible explanation for the devaluation effect is that activating
a focal need inhibits the activation level of unrelated needs
and goals. Such a mechanism would not require the valu-
ation effect to be larger than the devaluation effect and
would even allow for valuation and devaluation effects to
be governed by independent processes.
Although inhibition of unrelated goals is a promising
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mechanism for explaining devaluation effects, it is ineffi-
cient for one active goal to inhibit all other goals in the
motivational system. As an alternative, the motivational sys-
tem may only inhibit goals and needs that are proximal to
the focal need and thus may compete with it. Such a mech-
anism would be akin to the center-surround inhibitory mech-
anisms that are well known from perception (Kuffler et al.
1984). Consistent with this possibility, Brendl, Higgins, and
Lemm (1995) explored subjects’ sensitivity to gains and
losses and found that subjects were particularly insensitive
to events that were somewhat dissimilar to their chronic
goals, but regained sensitivity to events that were very dis-
similar to their chronic goals. These investigators posited
an inhibitory mechanism to explain this phenomenon.
Note that the term “inhibition“ is used in (at least) three
different ways in psychology. Inhibition may describe be-
havior rather than process (e.g., a decline in performance)
or a decrease in the overall activation or accessibility of a
mental representation, or it may mean that a particular men-
tal process is blocked from using a certain type of infor-
mation. Our use of “inhibition“ does not refer to behavior
but to process. The studies in this section focus primarily
on effects of decreasing the overall accessibility of a mental
representation. In the next section we focus on inhibitory
processes that interfere with the ability of a mental process
to make use of evaluative information.
Blocked Access to Evaluative Responses. In dem-
onstrations of negative priming the time to identify a probe
stimulus is slowed when subjects are instructed to ignore
that stimulus in a previous trial. Two processes contribute
to this effect. One involves blocking the access of mental
representations of previously ignored distractors to response
mechanisms (Tipper and Cranston 1985); the other involves
retrieving an episodic memory during the probe trial for the
priming episode. That memory has a “do not respond” tag
attached to the prime that then interferes with responding
to the probe when the two are identical. Both mechanisms
operate after the distractor has been selected by blocking
access to response mechanisms (Neill, Valdes, and Terry
1995).
Similarly, in demonstrations of retrieval interference, cued
recall of a target advertisement is weakened by presenting
it in the context of distractor advertisements for competing
brands. This inhibition of behavioral performance is caused
by an increase in associations between the retrieval cue (e.g.,
the brand name) and other mental representations (e.g., dis-
tractor advertisements). It is not caused by an inhibition of
the mental representation of the target advertisement itself
(Burke and Srull 1988).
We must be clear that we do not think that the devaluation
effect is an instance of negative priming, because this re-
quires that subjects actively ignore distractors (Neill et al.
1995). Rather, explanations of negative priming focus on
how access to information may be blocked without decreas-
ing the activation of that information. Similarly, devaluation
may occur when access to representations responsible for
evaluative responses is blocked rather than being inhibited.
Again, further research is required to explore this possibility.
Level of Need Activation as a Moderating
Condition
The lack of evidence for valuation effects in our studies
is counterintuitive. It is possible that our manipulations of
need strength were not sufficient to lead to a valuation effect.
Studies of valuation have not looked explicitly at the
strength of the manipulated goal. A more explicit variation
of goal or need strength might illuminate this issue. In this
context it is noteworthy that the devaluation effect is de-
tectable at the levels of need activation used in our studies.
Furthermore, an increase in goal strength would likely in-
crease the devaluation effect (in addition to any effects it
has on valuation effects). This prediction accords with in-
tuition, for example, that intense thirst would lead to a low
level of interest in bargains on non-drink-related items such
as jewelry. Furthermore, each of three hypothesized medi-
ators discussed in the previous section predicts that stronger
need activation will lead to a stronger devaluation effect.
Activating a focal need more strongly should draw more
activation away from other needs, inhibit unrelated needs
more strongly, and block access to unrelated evaluative re-
sponses more strongly.
Implications for the Formation of Preferences
Utility models suggest that objects are valued to the extent
that they can be used for satisfying a current goal. The
present results place two constraints on this view. First, the
value of objects decreases when the objects are perceived
as unrelated to the active goal. Second, relatedness to a goal
is a psychological measure, not a logical one. Thus, some
objects that can be used to satisfy a goal (e.g., money) may
not be perceived psychologically as instrumental. We now
consider the implications of these constraints for theories of
preference formation.
Prediction of Own Preferences. Loewenstein and col-
league’s work on the hot-cold empathy gap predicts that
people’s choices for future consumption are based on the
activation level of their present goals and needs because
they cannot mentally simulate future motivational states
(Loewenstein 1996). Consumers do not seem to learn ad-
equate theories about how preferences are affected by goals
and needs even though these would improve their predic-
tions. The devaluation effect might contribute to this learn-
ing difficulty because consumers would need to attend to
irrelevant information to detect devaluation.
Instrumentality. Economists attribute special value to
cash because of its fungibility. The system responsible for
the devaluation effect does not seem to recognize this ad-
vantage. It devalues cash in the presence of goals that could
be satisfied with cash. Loewenstein (2001) suggested that
decisions are not driven by careful deliberations but by au-
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tomatic pattern-matching and categorization processes that
then trigger category-specific decision rules. We suspect that
the devaluation of cash is the result of such a pattern-match-
ing process. Cash is not likely to be categorized as smokable,
although one can logically reason that cash can buy ciga-
rettes. These results suggest that perceived instrumentality
is not necessarily the result of logical reasoning but of fast
perceptual processes. If people reason, they may be left with
two conflicting and coexisting representations of the instru-
mentality of an object. This view would be consistent with
advances in the psychology of reasoning (Sloman 1996) and
in the psychology of attitudes (Wilson, Lindsey, and
Schooler 2000).
The Structure of Needs and Goals. To date, research-
ers have focused on hierarchical means-ends relations and
on relations of logically derived instrumentality (e.g., Ba-
gozzi and Dholakia 1999; Carver and Scheier 1981; Miller,
Galanter, and Pribram 1960; Ratneshwar et al. 2000). As
discussed, means-ends relations are mental representations
that result from reasoning about goals, but it is not clear
that we have full conscious access to our needs and goals
(Loewenstein 1996). To the degree that needs and goals are
the representational structures of the motivational system,
our findings suggest the intriguing possibility that the mo-
tivational system is structured differently than previously
assumed. If conscious access to needs and goals is limited,
then figuring out that structure is difficult. The devaluation
effect could serve as a tool in mapping out the structure of
needs and goals. In particular, to determine the breadth of
a goal’s end state, it should be possible to activate one goal
and then see what objects are devalued as a result of that
activation.
Where Do Our Conscious Goals Come From? Fi-
nally, we do consciously commit to goals, producing actions
that turn these goals into reality. We know very little, how-
ever, about the processes that let us commit to a particular
goal. Our choice of which goals to pursue cannot be driven
solely by reasoning—there are simply too many goals and
needs to be able to reason about all of them. Devaluation
might be one principle involved in creating equilibrium in
a system with so many components, serving the function of
keeping the system focused.
[Received November 2001. Revised July 2002. David
Glen Mick served as editor and Frank R. Kardes served
as associate editor for this article.]
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